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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
an attempt to organize thereunder, and (3) actual user of the cor-
porate franchise.... ".Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, (1901)
185 U. S. 1.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
Appeal by the State as subjecting Defendant to
double jeopardy.
The Federal Constitution and most State Constitutions
contain provisions which declare, "No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense." This ancient maxim
of the criminal law originated as a principle of English Com-
mon Law and was first used by Blackstone about the time the
pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict were formu-
lated. At the time of its inception no appeal was given to the
King or the defendant from a judgment of guilty or acquittal.
In England and the United States now, the defendant may
appeal and in some jurisdictions the State is awarded the
right of a new trial. The granting of this right to the State
has given rise to a great deal of discussion over the question
of whether or not the defendant by being subjected to a new
trial following an appeal is also being subjected to a second
jeopardy.
There seem to be two distinct views, which explains the
conflict.1 The first clings to the old Common Law concept of
jeopardy and holds the right of appeal unconstitutional; the
other allows the State the right of appeal. Those who accept
the second view justify it upon the theory that the original
jeopardy has not terminated at this stage of the procedure
and the appeal is merely a continuation of the original
jeopardy.
'In Conn., the State may appeal and bring the defendant back into
court for a new trial, even after acquittal. State v. Lee (1894) 65
Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110, 27 L. R. A. 498, 48 Am. St. Rep. 202; State v.
Garvey (1875) 42 Conn. 232.
In some States the right of appeal is refused in all cases. City
of Valdosta v. Goodwin (1918) 21 Ga. App. 664, 94 S. E. 812; Common-
wealth v. Cummings (Mass. 1849) 3 Cush. 212; State v. Morgan (1878)
4 Tex. App. 33; Prescott v. State (1907) 52 Tex. Cr. App. 35, 105 S. W.
192.
A statute granting the right of appeal to the State from an acquit-
tal after the trial of the crime is unconstitutional in some jurisdic-
tions. People v. Miner (1893) 144 Ill. 308, 33 N. E. 40, 19 L. R. A.
342; State v. Harville (1930) 171 La. 256, 130 S. 348; People v.
Erickson (1900) 39 Ore. 1, 62 P. 753.
An appeal by the State merely to determine questions of law has
been allowed in some States. State v. Stunkard (1911) 28 S.D. 311,
133 N. W. 253; Pa. Commonwealth v. Bienkowske (1939) 137 Pa.
Super. 474, 9 A. (2d) 169; Ex Parte Dexter (1919) 93 Vt. 304, 107 A.
134.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
The United States Supreme Court has held that the grant-
ing of the right of appeal to the Government is in conflict
with provisions forbidding double jeopardy. The court said,
"The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed
on error or otherwise, without putting the defendant twice in
jeopardy and thereby violating the constitution."' It should
be noted that Justice Holmes wrote a vigorous dissent in this
case. He maintains that a man cannot be said to be more
than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he
may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from
its beginning to the end of the cause. It is difficult to find
a reason for construing an appeal as subjecting the defendant
to double jeopardy. The reason most often advanced is that
of the desirability of procuring a final judgment and ending
litigation. This reasoning simply begs the question as to when
the first jeopardy terminates.!
Though the question of whether an appeal granted to the
State conflicts with provisions forbidding double jeopardy
has never been decided in Montana, it may well arise.' The
revised codes grant the right of appeal to the State in a
criminal case," and the Montana Constitution contains a pro-
2Kepner v. U. S. (1904) 195 U. S. 100, 49 L. Ed. 114, 24 S. C. 79T.
'Some cases hold that jeopardy has attached upon indictment, i.e.-
State v. Fields (1898) 106 Iowa 406, 76 N. W. 802; and State v. Crook
(1898) 16 Utah 212, 51 P. 1091. State v. Gillespie (1907) 162 Ind.
298, 80 N. E. 829 stands for the proposition that jeopardy attaches
when a jury is impanelled and sworn, and a Montana case, State v.
Kerl (1905) 33 Mont. 501, 85 P. 862, may be cited as authority that
jeopardy attaches at the commencement of the trial.
The prevailing viewpoint seems to be that a person is first put in
jeopardy when he has been placed on trial on a valid indictment or
information before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been ar-
raigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been impanelled and sworn.
For illustration see: People v. Fischer (1856) 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 28
Am. Dec. 501; State v. Hastings (1882) 86 N. C. 596; Alexander v.
Com. (1884) 105 Pa. 1; Stuart v. Com. (1887) 69 Va. (28 Grat.) 950.
'The precise question was raised in State v. Thierfelder (1934) 114
Mont. 14, 132 P. (2d) 1035 and was briefed by counsel, but was not
finally passed upon as it was not in the issue in the case. In that
case the State appealed in a criminal prosecution from an order of
the court made at the close of the State's case in chief, directing the
jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. The court said,
"While we do not decide this question here for the reason that it is
not in issue, we will say in passing that the decisions of this court do
not tend to show that the defendant has yet been once in jeopardy
for the offense charged." Although they said the defendant had not
yet been once in jeopardy, it may be assumed that the Court actually
meant the jeopardy had not terminated, since they cite State v. Keer
and State v. Aus as standing for the proposition.
6R. C. M. 1935, §12108.
"An appeal may be taken by the state
1. From a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to the indict-
ment;
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vision against double jeopardy.' However, it may be assumed
that Montana will decide that the statute granting the State
the right of appeal is constitutional. This conclusion seems
justified by the language of the Supreme Court in two leading
Montana cases,' which though not deciding the question under
discussion, seem to indicate that the Montana Court favors
the theory that an appeal is merely a continuation of the
original jeopardy. In State v. Keerl, the defendant was tried
for murder and the jury was discharged because of inability to
agree. The precise question was whether or not this discharge
was equivalent to an acquittal permitting the defendant to avail
himself of the plea of former jeopardy. In that case the Court
made the statement,
"The jeopardy which is forbidden is not a new jeop-
ardy. A mistrial or new trial secured by the plaintiff or
defendant continues the jeopardy and does not renew it."'
In State v. Aus, a much later case, the Montana Supreme
Court has followed the above language in saying that,
"When a new trial has been granted the defendant is
not placed in a new jeopardy by the second trial but is
merely subjected to the same jeopardy that he was in on the
first trial.'
In that case the defendant was convicted of larceny and
had served part of his sentence when he procured a new trial.
He then objected to further prosecution on the ground that the
second trial would subject him to double jeopardy. It was held
that where one convicted of a crime is granted a new trial, he
is not placed in new jeopardy by the second trial, but is in the
same jeopardy he was in when the first trial was had.
Logically, the theory of double jeopardy should be a ques-
tion of procedure. As in a civil action, the rights of the parties
cannot be determined until all questions arising thereunder
have been finally adjudicated by a court of last resort. The
State should not be precluded from such final adjudication
2. From an order granting a new trial;
3. From an order arresting judgment;
4. From an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the State.
5. From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the de-
fendant."
OMONT. CONST. Art. III, §18.
'See State v. Keerl (1905) 33 Mont. 501, 85 P. 862 and State v. Aus
(1937) 105 Mont. 82, 69 P. (2d) 584.
'State v. Keerl (1905) 33 Mont. 501, 85 P. 862. (Italics supplied).
9State v. Aus (1937) 15 Mont. 82, 69 P. (2nd) 584.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
merely because a criminal case is involved. Justice would seem
to dictate that the action be pursued to its ultimate end, es-
pecially today when society needs as much protection against
its offenders as does the accused against an avenging govern-
ment.
If double jeopardy were treated as a procedural question,
the principal would be limited to prevent an independent trial
of the same cause of action. Whether the appeal was or was
not an independent cause of action would depend upon whether
such appeal were authorized by the procedure in that juris-
diction. This idea is expressed in State v. Garvey in which it
is said,
"The principle which protects an individual from the
jeopardy involved in a second trial for the same offense
is well established and fully recognized. The question, how-
ever, as to what constitutes a trial depends upon the course
of procedure of the particular jurisdiction in which it is
had, and the construction of the courts there with respect
to it. ""0
This is in line with the viewpoint of J. Hammersley as
brought out in State v. Lee, in which he states,
"After verdict is returned, a retrial is awarded only
on further proceedings in the cause, which may or may not
be authorized by the law regulating procedure. If such
further proceedings are not authorized by the law regulat-
ing procedure, the cause is ended and the one jeopardy of
the accused is exhausted. This results solely from the fact
that the State, influenced by conditions of public policy,
has decided to make the verdict the end of the controversy."
"But when the State sees fit that further proceedings
on motion of the accused, may be had, an unjust verdict
resumes its normal position of a legal nullity, and when
the State provides for like proceedings on the motion of the
prosecution a similar result must follow.""
It is to be noted that both our own Court in State v. Keerl,
and this able opinion would uphold an appeal by the defendant
and one by the State on exactly the same ground-there is a
continuation of the original jeopardy in both cases alike. Of
course, no court has ever had any trouble holding constitu-
tional a statute giving the defendant a right of appeal and
providing for a new trial thereafter under the double jeopardy
provision. Those courts, ruling that such right of appeal in
"State v. Garvey (1875) 42 Conn. 232.
"State v. Lee (1894) 6 Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110.
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the State is unconstitutional, characteristically deprive the de-
fendant of the plea of former jeopardy upon a new trial follow-
ing the defendant's appeal by declaring that he waived the
right to so plead when he appealed. This theory is well put
by Ruling Case Law thus:
"It is generally conceded that a person convicted of
a crime waives his constitutional protection against being
twice in jeopardy where at his request the verdict against
him is set aside and a new trial is granted, defendant there-
fore under such circumstances may be tried again for the
same offense ***** where a conviction and judgment are
set aside on proceedings instituted by the defendant on the
ground that he has been deprived of a right guaranteed to
him by the constitution, the plea of former jeopardy can-
not avail to prevent a second trial." '2
Although the Court quoted this statement from Ruling
Case Law in State v. Aus, along with its primary thesis that
there was only a single jeopardy involved throughout, taken
directly from State v. Keerl, it is submitted that it in no way
intended to subscribe to the doctrine there enunciated. Either
the doctrine of waiver or that of the continuation of jeopardy
supported the actual ruling in that particular case, since it was
the defendant who had appealed. So the Court's citation of
Ruling Case Law was only to support the result, and not to
establish the controlling grounds for that result. That is, both
theories gave the desired result there. However, it is important
that the two doctrines, basically in conflict with each other, are
not confused. This basic conflict is quickly revealed when the
constitutionality of the right of the State to appeal is raised.
The doctrine of waiver assumes a former jeopardy. The idea
that the original jeopardy continues throughout the proceedings
repudiates that assumption.
To make the legal doctrine controlling the law of former
jeopardy consistent, both appeals should be allowed-and the
plea of former jeopardy upon a new trial thereafter-on exactly
the same ground. In State v. Keerl, Justice Milburn states this
position succintly and effectively by saying,
"A mistrial or a new trial secured by Plaintiff or De-
fendant continues the jeopardy and does not renew it.'"'
Logically this position is the most tenable. There can be no
new independent trial until every stage of procedure has been
-9 R. C. L. 160.
uState v. Keerl (1905) 33 Mont. 501, 85 P. 862. (Italics supplied).
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covered which is authorized by the particular jurisdiction.
Where an appeal is authorized either for the State or Lhe de-
fendant, such appeal is merely a continuation of the procedure
which has been invoked.
It may be argued that it is impossible to uphold this theory
if due regard is given to certain Montana Statutes. For ex-
ample, the Montana Constitution and Statutes admit all per-
sons to bail even after conviction upon an appeal subject to a
qualification not pertinent here." Elsewhere it also has been
ruled that the defendant is entitled to bail upon a new trial
to the same extent as though he had never been tried. The argu-
ment would be that by so doing the defendant is placed in the
same position as he was in at the commencement of the trial
and that it would thus appear that he is again subjected to
jeopardy upon the second trial. This argument is fallacious.
It does not necessarily follow simply because the defendant is
admitted to bail pending the appeal, that the jeopardy into
which he was placed has terminated. Since the law presumes
a man innocent until such time as his guilt is conclusively estab-
lished, a defendant is admitted to bail on the theory that since
he is at the time presumed innocent, he should not be unneces-
sarily deprived of his liberty. This is true even though the de-
fendant or the State is appealing from a verdict of acquittal or
conviction. The bailment statute operates quite independently
of the provisions forbidding double jeopardy.
Another Montana Statute lays down the rule that, "The
granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position
as if no trial had been had.' It may be argued that if this
is true the defendant can say he has once been in jeopardy, and
that therefore the Montana Courts' theory of continuation of
jeopardy cannot be upheld. However, this statute should not
be cited as being contra to the position taken by the court since
it is a rule governing the introduction of evidence and other
procedural matters and is independent of the jeopardy pro-
visions. Since the better view is that a new trial continues
jeopardy, a new trial granted on appeal should not be inter-
preted under this statute as placing the defendant in a position
in which it could be said that jeopardy ever terminated.
If it is ever contended that the Montana statute authorizing
an appeal by the State is unconstitutional, the Montana Supreme
14R. C. M. 1935, §§12135, 12137, 12138;
MONT. CONST. Art. III, §19;
Ex parte Patterson (1917) 81 Tex. Cr. R. 28, S. W. 861.
This decision would prevail under R. C. M. 1935, §12047.UR. C. M. 1935, §12047.
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Court should uphold the doctrine expressed in State v. Aus.,
and State v. Keerl and limit the doctrine of double jeopardy
so as to forbid a trial only in a new and independent case after
the defendant or the State has exhausted its rights to further
proceedings in the original case."
0. Louise Replogle.
'Although stating in the commentaries thereto that, at present, the
State can appeal from a general acquittal only in Connecticut, it is of
interest to note that the American Law Institute has proposed that the
State should have a right to a new trial after general acquittal where
"... in the course of the trial, a material error has been made to the
prejudice of the State." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ADMINISTRATION
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY, Proposed Final Draft
(1935) Sec. 13, comments, page 111 ff. It also recognizes that a new
trial is only a continuation of the original proceedings in all cases.
Ibid, Sec. 14, comments page 116 ff.
Though R. C. M. 1935, §12108 does not expressly provide for such
new trial for the State, and although R. C. M. 1935, §11612 provides
that no person can be tried a second time after he is once acquitted,
the doctrine of the Keerl and the Aus cases, that a new trial is only
a continuation of the original prosecution will support the granting of
a new trial to the State following a general acquittal. Cf.: State v.
Peck (1928) 83 Mont. 327, 271 P. 707.
LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR
DEFECTIVE STREETS AND SIDEWALKS
From the beginning, apart from statute, thirty-four (34)
states have held municipal corporations liable to private action
for injuries resulting from defects or obstructions in streets
or sidewalks based upon the common law right of recovery
against a city for actionable negligence.' The contrary rule
prevails in the New England States and a few others. But
statutes now impose liability in most of the latter class of states!
Montana decisions have consistently recognized the doctrine
of municipal liability for damages to persons or property by
reason of any negligently maintained defects or obstructions in
streets and sidewalks. In one of the earliest cases, Snook v. City
'MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2901 p. 8.
'MCQUILLAN CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2901 p. 12.
Generally concerning a public way, the judicial decisions have estab-
lished and imposed obligations upon municipal corporations for the
following reasons: (1) Streets must be constructed in a reasonably
safe manner, and to this end ordinary care must be exercised. (2)
They must at all times be kept in proper repair or in a reasonably
safe condition by the exercise of ordinary diligence and continuous
supervision. (3) Reasonably safe condition or proper repair implies
that bridges, dangerous embankments, walls and declivities near the
way must be safeguarded by adequate railings, barriers or appropriate
signals.
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